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I. INTRODUCTION 
Education in America is making the news often these days, and 
usually not in a good way.1  Much of the discussion centers on access 
by those historically underserved by the American educational sys-
tem.2  A good amount of the coverage deals more specifically with 
access to educational materials.3  The textbook industry at both the 
K–12 and the higher education levels has been noted for its profit-
driven model and the issues that model presents.4  Many educators 
rely upon fair use to provide their students with supplemental ma-
terials while minimizing cost.5  A recent case that originated in the 
Northern District of Georgia, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker 
 
 1. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, America’s School Funding Problems, State by State, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 5, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2014/02/05/americas-
school-funding-problems-state-by-state; Doug Lederman, State Budgeters’ View of Higher 
Ed, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 27, 2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/03
/27/state-state-funding-higher-education. 
 2. See, e.g., Lindsey Cook, U.S. Education: Still Separate and Unequal, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (Jan. 28, 2015 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-
mine/2015/01/28/us-education-still-separate-and-unequal. 
 3. See, e.g., Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., to Colleague (Oct. 1, 2014) available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/of-
fices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-resourcecomp-201410.pdf; Bruce D. Baker, David G. Sciarra & 
Danielle Farrie, School Funding in Most States Unfair: Inequitable Funding Systems 
Shortchanging Nation’s Students, SCHOOLFUNDINGFAIRNESS.ORG (June 8, 2015), 
http://www.schoolfundingfairness.org/. 
 4. See, e.g., Zachary Crockett, Why are Textbooks so Expensive?, PRICEONOMICS (Dec. 
18, 2013), http://priceonomics.com/why-are-textbooks-so-expensive. 
 5. Many educational institutions provide a roadmap of fair use on their websites in or-
der to encourage fair use in the classroom and to ensure it is done in an appropriate manner. 
See, e.g., Copyright: Academic Copying and Student Course Packets, YALE UNIVERSITY, 
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL, http://ogc.yale.edu/copyright-aca-
demic-copying-and-student-course-packets (last visited Dec. 9, 2015); Fair Use, STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES, http://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/ (last visited Dec. 9, 
2015); Copyright and Fair Use, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, https://www.nyu.edu/footer/copy-
right-and-fair-use.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2015); Fair Use Checklist, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
LIBRARIES, COPYRIGHT ADVISORY OFFICE, https://copyright.columbia.edu/basics/fair-use/fair-
use-checklist.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2015); see also, Caitlin Ubl, Faculty Members Propose 
Intellectual Property Rights for Scholarly Works, THE WILLIAMS RECORD (February 17, 2016), 
http://williamsrecord.com/2016/02/17/faculty-members-propose-intellectual-property-rights-
for-scholarly-work/ (creating a policy to protect not only the intellectual property rights of 
the college, but also the professors and students). 
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(“Georgia State”),6 and has since been appealed to and reversed and 
remanded by the Eleventh Circuit in Cambridge Univ. Press v. Pat-
ton (“Georgia State II”),7 demonstrates some potential landmines 
associated with fair use in the educational context.  This article con-
siders those landmines and suggests an alternative approach to ed-
ucators depending upon fair use. 
In 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Geor-
gia issued a lengthy and detailed decision in Georgia State which 
undertook to consider, work-by-work, whether Georgia State Uni-
versity had committed copyright infringement in over seventy in-
stances or, in the alternative, engaged in fair use.8  The copyright 
infringement allegations in the case rested upon actions that very 
likely take place at educational institutions all over this country, 
every day—teachers placing portions of copyrighted works on the 
school’s electronic reserves or learning management system.9  The 
works at issue were all nonfiction, social science, or education-re-
lated texts, including: Pronunciation Games,10 The Cambridge 
Companion to Beethoven,11 Understanding Trauma,12 and The 
Handbook of Feminist Research.13  A complete list of the works ap-
pears in an appendix to the district court’s opinion.14  Ultimately, 
after the case had been pending for more than four years,15 after 
both parties had filed motions for summary judgment,16 and one 
year after a trial that began on May 17, 2011 and in which testi-
mony ended on June 7, 2011,17 the court only found five instances 
of infringement.18 
 
 6. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012) [hereinafter 
Georgia State]. 
 7. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Georgia 
State II]. 
 8. See generally, id. 
 9. Id. at 1220–21.  Note that it is merely our intuition that these practices are wide-
spread.  We have conducted no empirical analysis, but believe that such an undertaking 
would be a useful first step in developing the data that educators would need in order to 
meaningfully engage in an effort for statutory changes. 
 10. Id. at 1244–46. 
 11. Id. at 1297–99. 
 12. Id. at 1291–92. 
 13. Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1255–56. 
 14. Id. at 1364. 
 15. Id. at 1201 (“The original Complaint was filed on April 15, 2008.”). 
 16. Id. at 1202 (“Summary Judgment Motions were filed by both sides on February 26, 
2010.”). 
 17. K. Matthew Dames, Decision Summary: Publishers v. Georgia State University, 
SYRACUSE COPYRIGHT & INFORMATION POLICY OFFICE (May 14, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://copy-
right.syr.edu/publishers-v-georgia-state/. 
 18. Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. 
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Shortly after the district court decision, Professor Peter Jaszi, of 
American University Washington College of Law, authored a piece 
entitled Fair Use and Education: The Way Forward.19  The piece 
was published as the case was up on appeal.20  In it, Professor Jaszi 
argues that the idea of “educational exceptionalism” is a myth.  He 
defines “educational exceptionalism” as: 
[T]he notion that teaching and learning are so special, and so 
highly favored in copyright policy and fair use law, that it 
ought to be possible to get courts to cut education some special 
slack, beyond that which they extend to uses of third-party cop-
yright material by filmmakers or musicians or publishers..21 
Rather, as the Georgia State decisions exemplify, educators and ed-
ucational institutions are treated like every other unlicensed user 
of copyrighted materials;22 they are expected to prove that each use 
is a fair use firmly within the confines of existing fair use jurispru-
dence.  Jaszi further asserts that endeavoring to change the copy-
right statute is a lost cause23 and offers, as the least bad alternative, 
the possibility of educators articulating their uses as transforma-
tive and, therefore, well within the recognized parameters of the 
fair use doctrine.24 
This piece responds to Professor Jaszi’s article.  Part II briefly 
analyzes the Georgia State decisions out of the Northern District of 
Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit.  The analysis is intended to 
demonstrate the uphill battle educational institutions are likely to 
face in following Professor Jaszi’s recommendation.  In Part III this 
 
 19. Peter Jaszi, Fair Use and Education: The Way Forward, 25 LAW & LITERATURE 33 
(2013). 
 20. Id. at 34. 
 21. Id. at 36 (“There’s little if any evidence for the proposition that education actually 
enjoys (as distinct from being morally entitled to enjoy) a preferential position in the array 
of positive human activities that, from time to time, may lay claim to special treatment under 
copyright law.”). 
 22. See generally Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190; Georgia State II, 769 F.3d 1232. 
 23. Jaszi, supra note 19, at 35–36 (“There is absolutely no indication that educators could 
lobby Congress to expand their specified use rights under copyright (let alone those of their 
students), especially in an environment where rightsholders in general appear to have taken 
a pledge not to support any new exceptions to copyright, no matter how well justified.”). 
 24. Id. at 36 (“So in the end, educators don’t have any good choices here—except to try to 
make the fair use doctrine as it stands work better for teachers and students today and to-
morrow.”); id. at 40 (“Educators’ best chance, then, is to catch a ride on the train that is 
already moving—the clear trend toward transformativeness analysis.”).  One of the authors 
has previously suggested that a particular group of alleged copyright infringers take ad-
vantage of the potential “transformativeness” presents.  See Deidré A. Keller, “What He 
Said…”: The Transformative Potential of the Use of Copyrighted Content in Political Cam-
paigns, or, How a Win for Mitt Romney Might Have Been a Victory for Free Speech, 16 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 497 (2014). 
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article considers the pragmatic issues fair use presents for educa-
tional institutions accused of copyright infringement; specifically 
institutional risk-aversion and potential costs of and exposure to 
liability.  In Part IV, we suggest an alternative to Jaszi’s approach; 
we call for educators to organize and strategize around a legislative 
solution that recognizes the importance of education to the purpose 
of copyright, as articulated in the Constitution.25  Part V concludes. 
II. THE GEORGIA STATE DECISIONS AND THE MESS THAT IS 
EDUCATIONAL FAIR USE 
Jaszi’s piece begins with a reference to the Northern District of 
Georgia’s opinion in Georgia State:26  “In May 2012, Judge Orinda 
D. Evans of the federal district court in Atlanta issued a decision . . 
. that has been rightly hailed as a significant recognition of educa-
tors’ rights to use copyrighted material in their teaching.”27  While 
the opinion was read as a victory for Georgia State—even Judge 
Evans saw it this way, declaring the defendants the prevailing 
party and awarding them attorneys’ fees and costs28—one need not 
dig too far to recognize the pyrrhic nature of that victory for educa-
tional institutions writ large.  As an initial matter, both the North-
ern District of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit held that the uses 
in question were “nontransformative.”29  Moreover, these decisions 
demonstrate the very real problems posed by the Agreement on 
Guidelines in Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational In-
stitutions (“Classroom Guidelines”).30  Finally, if nothing else, the 
 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 26. Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. 
 27. Jaszi, supra note 19, at 33. 
 28. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123154, at *22–23 (N.D. Ga. 
Aug. 10, 2012); see also Jeffrey R. Galin, A Big Win for Georgia State for Online Reserves, 
CONFERENCE ON COLLEGE COMPOSITION AND COMMUNICATION (January 28, 2013), 
http://www.ncte.org/cccc/committees/ip/ipreports/bigwin; Rick Anderson, Final Score in the 
Georgia State Game: Library 94, Publishers 5, THE SCHOLARLY KITCHEN (May 17, 2012), 
http://scholarlykitchen.sspnet.org/2012/05/17/final-score-in-the-georgia-state-game-library-
94-publishers-5/; Jonathan Pink, Fair Use Found in Georgia State University Copyright In-
fringement Suit, HOT TOPICS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION 
(May 15, 2012), http://www.jonathanpinkesq.com/fair-use-found-in-georgia-state-university-
copyright-infringement-suit. 
 29. Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 1263 (“Although an electronic reserve system may facil-
itate easy access to excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works, it does nothing to transform those works.”); 
id. at 1289 (Vinson, J., concurring) (“The use of the works in this case, as the majority opinion 
notes and the Defendants have not really contested, was obviously non-transformative.”); 
Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (“Taking into account the fact that this case involves 
only mirror-image, nontransformative uses, the amount used must be decidedly small to 
qualify as fair use.”); see also infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 68 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681; see 
also sources cited infra notes 45–56 and accompanying text. 
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lesson that the Georgia State decisions teach is that any fair use 
victory for an educational institution defendant cannot be relied 
upon as either a prospective guide for institutions seeking to avoid 
copyright litigation or as binding precedent in later disputes.31  The 
remainder of this section considers these three glaring problems as 
they are presented in the Georgia State decisions. 
A. The “Purpose and Character” of Educational Uses: Non-Profit 
May Lean Toward Fair But Educational Does Not Equal 
Transformative 
There are a number of points of convergence between the North-
ern District of Georgia and Eleventh Circuit’s Georgia State opin-
ions.  None of them bode well for the educational institution seeking 
to navigate the morass that is educational fair use.32  Of these, the 
one most troubling for Jaszi’s prescription is the courts’ treatment 
of the first fair use factor.33  In analyzing the first fair use factor, 
the district court stated: 
The language of § 107 itself and the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Campbell compel the decision that the first fair use factor 
favors Defendants.  This case involves making copies of ex-
cerpts of copyrighted works for teaching students and for schol-
arship, as specified in the preamble of § 107.  The use is for 
strictly nonprofit educational purposes as specified in § 107(1).  
The fact that the copying is done by a nonprofit educational 
institution leaves no doubt on this point.34 
The majority opinion out of the Eleventh Circuit arrives at the 
same conclusion,35 though its analysis is more thorough, touching 
upon the references to educational uses within the fair use provi-
sion of the statute, as well as the legislative history associated with 
the fair use provision.36  By far, the opinion that demonstrates the 
 
 31. See, e.g., Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1210, 1232; Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 
1269, 1277–84; Jaszi, supra note 19, at 34–36; see also sources cited infra notes 57–70 and 
accompanying text. 
 32. Jaszi treats the existing state of the jurisprudence concerning educational fair uses 
prior to the Georgia State decisions on pages 36 to 44 of his piece. Jaszi, supra note 19, at 
36–44.  Rather than revisit that jurisprudence, this piece will seek to place the Georgia State 
decisions in the larger contexts of the state of higher education and the existing political 
climate. 
 33. See Jaszi, supra note 19, at 38–39; Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224–25; Georgia 
State II, 769 F.3d at 1261–68. 
 34. Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. 
 35. Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 1263. 
 36. Id. at 1263–68. 
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least deference towards educational uses as fair uses is the concur-
rence to the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, written by Judge Vinson.37 
Judge Vinson’s derisiveness toward the notion of educational ex-
ceptionalism leaps off the page.  In characterizing the treatment of 
this factor by the majority and the District Court, Judge Vinson 
says: 
While I agree that educational use is an important factor to 
consider, and there is much to recommend in the majority’s 
thoughtful analysis and detailed consideration of this issue—
which stands in stark contrast to the District Court’s perfunc-
tory (two page) analysis—I simply cannot agree that the first 
factor weighs in favor of fair use just because the works are 
being used for educational purposes at a non-profit univer-
sity.38 
Vinson decrees: “Neither churches, charities, nor colleges get a free 
ride in copyright, however. The test is ultimately the same for them 
as it is for everyone else: is the use ‘fair’ under the specific circum-
stances?”39 
Judge Vinson’s estimation of educational use under this factor 
certainly supports Jaszi’s argument that educational institutions 
are afforded no greater fair use rights than anyone else.40  Unfortu-
nately, the solution Jaszi proposes takes a hit from the treatment 
of factor one in the Georgia State decisions which are, after all, the 
first comprehensive decisions on fair use by a higher education in-
stitution.41  All of the opinions agree that the use in question is non-
transformative.42  Both the Northern District of Georgia and the 
Eleventh Circuit rely upon language from the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Campbell v. Acuff–Rose,43 for the notion that verbatim uses 
are not transformative:44 “[t]he obvious statutory exception to this 
 
 37. Id. at 1284–91 (Vinson, J., concurring). 
 38. Id. at 1288 (Vinson, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Jaszi, supra note 19, at 36. 
 41. Id. at 40. 
 42. Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 1267 (“Defendants’ use of Plaintiffs’ works is nontrans-
formative . . . .”); Id. at 1289 (Vinson, J., concurring) (“The use of the works in this case, as 
the majority opinion notes and the Defendants have not really contested, was obviously non-
transformative.”); Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (“Taking into account the fact that 
this case involves only mirror-image, nontransformative uses, the amount used must be de-
cidedly small to qualify as fair use.”). 
 43. Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 44. Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 n.11); Geor-
gia State II, 769 F.3d at 1268 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 n.11). 
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focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multi-
ple copies for classroom distribution.”45  While nothing in the stat-
ute necessarily precludes educational uses from being deemed 
transformative,46 successfully making that argument in the face of 
this seeming consensus to the contrary appears highly unlikely.  
Meanwhile, relying upon fair use in the educational context likely 
also means an accused infringer will have to face the Classroom 
Guidelines, which present their own difficulties. 
B. The Classroom Guidelines are An Albatross 
The legislative history associated with the fair use provision in-
cludes a full reproduction of the Classroom Guidelines.47  These 
Classroom Guidelines were the result of long and arduous negotia-
tions among representatives of publishers, educational institutions, 
and other stakeholders.48  The intention was for the negotiating 
parties to propose statutory language embodying a fair use provi-
sion specific to education.49  However, the ultimate result was a 
non-binding document that has been influential in shaping educa-
tional fair use jurisprudence.50 
The Classroom Guidelines were immediately questioned.  The 
House Report states, “[r]epresentatives of the American Association 
of University Professors and of the Association of American Law 
Schools have written to the Committee strongly criticizing the 
guidelines, particularly with respect to multiple copying, as being 
too restrictive with respect to classroom situations at the university 
and graduate level.”51  In discussing these Classroom Guidelines, 
Jaszi notes: 
Perhaps the best that can be said for this approach [of negoti-
ating guidelines] is that it has been tried, and the results have 
not been pretty.  Negotiated guidelines tend (when they can be 
agreed upon at all) to be strict, narrow, and more focused on 
 
 45. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 n.11. 
 46. Of course, transformativeness is not a stated statutory requirement.  See Kienitz v. 
Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The district court and the parties 
have debated whether the t-shirts are a ‘transformative use’ of the photo—and, if so, just how 
‘transformative’ the use must be. That’s not one of the statutory factors, though the Supreme 
Court mentioned it in Campbell . . . .”) (parallel citations omitted). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 68–70 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681–
84. 
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5660. 
 49. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5660. 
 50. Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 613 (2001). 
 51. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 72, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5685. 
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metrics than on the nature of the educational enterprise; worse 
still, rightsholders have shown an irrepressible tendency to in-
terpret guidelines that were designed to create ‘‘safe harbors’’ 
for users as outer limits on permissible use.52 
Jaszi’s insights are borne out in the treatment of the Classroom 
Guidelines in the Georgia State opinions.  Jaszi is exactly right 
when he notes that rightsholders see the Classroom Guidelines as 
the limit on fair use rather than the safe-harbor minimum.  The 
district court noted as much, stating: 
Plaintiffs assert that the Court should enforce, through an in-
junctive order, the safe harbor limitations of the Guidelines as 
maximum permissible use, with the exception of the so-called 
“spontaneity” requirement which Plaintiffs do not insist upon.  
Plaintiffs do not explain their decision to seek acceptance of the 
minimum standards as the maximum standard.”53 
Thankfully, both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit rec-
ognized the Guidelines were intended to state minimum allowable 
uses rather than maximum uses and refused to read the Classroom 
Guidelines as a limit on Georgia State’s fair use.54  Unfortunately, 
Judge Vinson’s concurrence evidences no such understanding.  He 
writes: 
To the extent the majority  . . . reject[s] Plaintiffs’ claim that 
the Classroom Guidelines should further inform the analysis . 
. ., I disagree.  The guidelines—which expressly deal with fair 
use of copyrighted material in the classroom context and place 
limits on not-for-profit educational copying—are a compro-
mised and negotiated arms-length agreement that Congress 
had asked for, and was fully aware of and took into account, at 
the time that Section 107 was enacted.  They provide, inter alia, 
strict word count limits on allowable copying, such as the lesser 
of an excerpt from a prose work of not more than 1,000 words 
or 10 percent of the work.  While the majority opinion is correct 
that the guidelines do not create a hard evidentiary presump-
 
 52. Jaszi, supra note 19, at 36. 
 53. Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1228. 
 54. Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 1274; Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1228. 
182 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 54 
tion or carry force of law, they are still important to this anal-
ysis . . . and I believe they deserve more weight and considera-
tion than the majority has allowed.55 
Judge Vinson’s treatment of the Classroom Guidelines under-
scores the issues they present.  Judge Vinson certainly is not alone 
in his treatment of the Classroom Guidelines demonstrating the 
limits of educational fair use rather than the safe harbor.56  And 
while Jaszi clearly recognizes this issue,57 he seems to disregard the 
fact that courts considering fair use in the context of educational 
uses often seem to make reference to the Classroom Guidelines for 
good or ill.58  Hitching the future of unlicensed educational uses on 
the train of fair use and transformativeness necessarily means that 
we will continue to languish under the weight of the existing Class-
room Guidelines.  Additionally, relying upon fair use means sub-
jecting educational institutions to the grueling task of defending 
each and every unlicensed use of anything more than a de minimis 
excerpt as a fair use, with all of the fact-intensive, case-by-case in-
quiry that implies. 
C. Case-by-Case, Work-by-Work, and No Bright-Line Rules 
It has long been held that fair use is an affirmative defense on 
which the defendant carries the burden of proof.59  Likewise, fair 
use determinations are recognized as fact-sensitive, requiring case-
by-case analysis.60  In Georgia State II, the Eleventh Circuit ratified 
the district court’s work-by-work analysis, stating:61 
We understand “case-by-case” and “work-by-work” to be synon-
ymous in cases where a copyright proprietor alleges numerous 
 
 55. Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 1290 (Vinson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 56. See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1536 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“There is dispute as to whether the Guidelines represent a maximum or 
minimum of allowable copying.”). 
 57. Jaszi, supra note 19, at 36; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 58. Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 1290; see also Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Docu-
ment Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Basic Books, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1522. 
 59. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985); for an interest-
ing discussion on the history of how fair use morphed from a right into an affirmative defense, 
see generally Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135 (2011).  
Snow argues that fair use began as a right that turned into an excuse for infringement 
through the mistake of two treatise writers.  Id. at 154–59.  The mistake was then adopted 
by courts and, eventually, in Harper & Row, by the Supreme Court.  Id. at 159–68. 
 60. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587; see also, Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 561. 
 61. Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 1259–60 (“the District Court’s work-by-work approach—
in which the District Court considered whether the fair use defense excused a representative 
sample of instances of alleged infringement in order to determine the need for injunctive 
relief—was the proper one.”). 
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instances of copyright infringement and a secondary user 
claims that his or her use was fair.  Courts must apply the fair 
use factors to each work at issue.  Otherwise, courts would have 
no principled method of determining whether a nebulous cloud 
of alleged infringements purportedly caused by a secondary 
user should be excused by the defense of fair use.62 
This is a problem for educational institutions, as it means all ed-
ucational fair use litigation that concerns an institution’s policies 
and, therefore, many copyrighted works, will necessarily be pains-
taking and expensive.  Given that the works at issue in the Georgia 
State cases were fact-based works generally understood not to be at 
the center of the protection afforded by copyright,63 demonstrating 
fair use would likely be an even more difficult task for educators 
engaging more creative works, like works of fiction or visual art.  
The problem of expense is exacerbated by the fact that the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed two attempts by the district court to lay down 
bright-line rules that could guide both educational institutions 
wishing to avoid potential copyright infringement and future courts 
considering fair use defenses.  What follows is a discussion of those 
bright-lines, as treated in both the district and appellate courts. 
The district court painstakingly considered the prima facie case 
of infringement, and, where such a showing was found, the viability 
of the fair use defense as to each allegedly infringed work.  In an 
effort to simplify its analysis, the court stated that as to all of the 
allegedly infringed works, factor two, “the nature of the copyrighted 
work,”64 favored a finding of fair use.65  Likewise, it applied “a 10 
percent-or-one-chapter benchmark”66 under which the third statu-
tory factor, “amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole,”67 would favor a finding of 
fair use.68  The Eleventh Circuit rejected both mechanisms.  As to 
the factor two analysis, the Eleventh Circuit held: 
 
 62. Id. at 1258 n.20. 
 63. Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1244–46, 1255–56, 1291–92, 1297–99, 1364. 
 64. Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1225–27. 
 65. Id. at 1226–27. 
 66. Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 1271. 
 67. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2015). 
 68. Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. at 1243 (“Where a book is not divided into chapters or 
contains fewer than ten chapters, . . . copying of no more than 10% of the pages in the book 
is permissible . . . .  Where a book contains ten or more chapters, . . . copying of up to but no 
more than one chapter . . . will be permissible . . . .”). 
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[W]e find that the District Court erred in holding that the sec-
ond factor favored fair use in every instance.  Where the ex-
cerpts of Plaintiffs’ works contained evaluative, analytical, or 
subjectively descriptive material that surpasses the bare facts 
necessary to communicate information, or derives from the au-
thor’s experiences or opinions, the District Court should have 
held that the second factor was neutral, or even weighed 
against fair use in cases of excerpts that were dominated by 
such material. . . .69 
As to the issue of the amount of each work used, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit stated: 
[T]he District Court erred in applying a 10 percent-or-one-
chapter safe harbor in it [sic] analysis of the individual in-
stances of alleged infringement.  The District Court should 
have analyzed each instance of alleged copying individually, 
considering the quantity and the quality of the material 
taken—including whether the material taken constituted the 
heart of the work—and whether that taking was excessive in 
light of the educational purpose of the use and the threat of 
market substitution.70 
Taken together, these two holdings demonstrate that on remand 
the district court will have to conduct even more thorough analyses 
than that contained in its prior lengthy opinion. 
While the costs associated with the appeal and the more search-
ing analysis required by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision are not yet 
known, what we do know from the existing decisions is that the dis-
trict court in Georgia State issued an order “awarding Defendants 
attorneys’ fees in the amount of $2,861,348.71 and costs in the 
amount of $85,746.39. . . .”71  This award was overturned on ap-
peal.72  But, having it documented in the decisions helps to demon-
strate precisely what an institution of higher learning is undertak-
ing in defending a piece of copyright infringement litigation.  Given 
the current state of higher education, it seems difficult to charac-
terize even Georgia State, which undoubtedly required the outlay of 
significant resources, as a victory for most educational institutions. 
 
 69. Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 1270. 
 70. Id. at 1275. 
 71. Id. at 1253. 
 72. Id. 
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III. HOW DO YOU SOLVE A PROBLEM LIKE UNLICENSED 
EDUCATIONAL (FAIR) USE? 
A. The Higher Education “Bubble” 
In 2012 Glenn Harlan Reynolds released a book entitled, The 
Higher Education Bubble.73  In it, he argues that, like housing, 
higher education in the United States has, as a result of cheap 
credit and people expecting ever-higher returns on investment, ex-
perienced inflation.74  And, like any bubble, this bubble too, will and 
must pop.75  Since Reynolds’ book, a number of scholars have ad-
dressed the crisis in higher education.76  While few agree as to the 
causes or solutions, most people paying attention will tell you that 
higher education in America is in trouble.  To take just one metric, 
enrollment at institutions of higher learning in the United States, 
after a period of growth from 2006 to 2011, dropped in both 2012 
and 2013.77  In May of 2014, Inside HigherEd published a piece en-
titled “Nearing the Bottom,” in which the opening line was, “The 
decline in overall college enrollment has slowed this spring. . . .”78  
As recently as December 2014, Moody’s Investor Service noted, 
“[o]ur outlook for the four-year US Higher Education sector is neg-
ative.”79  Many observers expected to see institutions shuttering.80  
And, indeed, some have.81  In the midst of this uncertainty in the 
sector, it is truly incomprehensible to think that institutions of 
 
 73. GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS, THE HIGHER EDUCATION BUBBLE (2012). 
 74. Id. at 1–2. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., David A. Smith, The Subprime Education Crisis, BIPARTISAN POLICY 
CENTER, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/subprime-education-crisis/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2015); 
Anthony Davies & James R. Harrigan, Why the Education Bubble will be Worse than the 
Housing Bubble, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (June 12, 2012 11:30 AM), http://www.us-
news.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/06/12/the-government-shouldnt-subsi-
dize-higher-education; Lizzie O’Leary, Is Student Loan Debt the Next Housing Crisis?, 
MARKETPLACE (Aug. 30, 2013, 4:56 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/your-money/ed-
ucation/student-loan-debt-next-housing-crisis. 
 77. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COLLEGE ENROLLMENT DECLINES FOR SECOND YEAR IN A ROW, 
CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS, Release No. CB14–177 (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.cen-
sus.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-177.html?. 
 78. Paul Fain, Nearing the Bottom, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 15, 2014), https://www.in-
sidehighered.com/news/2014/05/15/new-data-show-slowing-national-enrollment-decline/. 
 79. Kimberly Tuby, et. al., 2015 Outlook—US Higher Education, MOODY’S INVESTOR 
SERVICE (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?do-
cid=PBM_1000311. 
 80. See, e.g., Alia Wong, The Downfall of For-Profit Colleges, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/02/the-downfall-of-for-profit-colle
ges/385810/. 
 81. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Sweet Briar College Is Saved but Is Not in the Clear, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/us/sweet-briar-collegeis-
saved-but-not-in-the-clear.html. 
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higher education are poised to take the risks associated with the 
type of litigation strategy Professor Jaszi suggests.  Academic ad-
ministrators are known to be a risk-averse lot;82 no doubt they are 
even more so in this climate.  Given the significant potential cost of 
defending against copyright infringement allegations, risk aversion 
seems rational. 
B. Copyright Litigation is Expensive 
The American Intellectual Property Lawyers Association 
(“AIPLA”) conducts an Annual Economic Survey.  According to the 
data AIPLA gathered in 2013, the last year for which data is pres-
ently available, litigating a copyright infringement case in which 
less than $1 million was at stake through the discovery phase cost 
approximately $150,000.83  Of course, the higher the potential lia-
bility, the higher the litigation costs.  Litigating a case where liabil-
ity was up to $25 million cost $1.625 million, inclusive of all costs.84  
These are median figures, and AIPLA does not provide data for 
costs associated with litigating fair use issues or infringement of 
more than one work.  Because multiple works and fair use would 
likely both be at issue in any case concerning educational institu-
tions’ unlicensed use of copyrighted content, AIPLA’s figures may 
not even be in the ballpark.  Nonetheless, they are the best availa-
ble figures outside of the anecdotal data of awards for attorney’s 
fees and costs contained in various opinions.85  At the very least, 
this data substantiates the concerns prompted by the Georgia State 
opinions: the type of litigation Professor Jaszi is suggesting is 
simply out of reach for all but the most elite institutions in the coun-
try.  Given Jaszi’s admission that “‘test cases’ in copyright law [are] 
difficult to frame,”86 it is hard to see how the strategy he outlines—
reliance upon fair use’s transformativeness standard—could be vi-
able. 
 
 82. Ethan Perlstein, Why are Academics so Risk Averse, SYMPOSIUM MAGAZINE, Aug. 13, 
2013, http://www.symposium-magazine.com/why-are-academics-so-risk-averse/. 
 83. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, 2013 REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY (2013). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., No. 89 Civ. 2807, 1991 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 19930, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (awarding Plaintiffs $1,365,000 in costs and fees). 
 86. Jaszi, supra note 19, at 40. 
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C. Fair Use: Even When You “Win,” It’s Probably Going to Cost 
You; If You Lose, It Could Cost You Big… 
As mentioned above, the cost for Georgia State to litigate this dis-
pute before the Northern District through the initial decision was 
nearly three million dollars.87  Even though Georgia State was 
widely lauded as a victory, that price tag is enough to scare many 
institutions of higher learning away from such a dispute in the first 
place.  The fact that the award of attorney’s fees and costs was over-
turned on appeal makes that even more likely.  When one considers 
the fact that the Georgia State defendants were in a privileged po-
sition in terms of the potential for damages liability, the idea that 
a private educational institution would ever seek to press its fair 
use claims in court seems even less plausible.  To begin to under-
stand the potential exposure a private institution might face, con-
sidering Georgia State’s exemption from damages liability is in-
structive. 
The plaintiffs in the Georgia State case sued seeking only injunc-
tive and declaratory relief.88  This is not terribly surprising because 
sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment usually shield 
states and state actors from damages liability.89  Such immunity 
remains in the context of copyright infringement suits despite Con-
gress’ attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Copy-
right Remedy Clarification Act.90  The Copyright Remedy Clarifica-
tion Act has been deemed unconstitutional by a number of courts 
 
 87. Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 1253; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 88. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 29–30, Cambridge 
Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1201 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (No. 1:08–CV–1425). 
 89. See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 106 
YALE L.J. 1683 (1997). 
 90. 17 U.S.C. § 511 (2002): 
(a) In General.  Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee 
of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not 
be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal Court by any 
person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for a violation of any 
of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner provided by sections 106 through 122 [17 
U.S.C.S. §§ 106–122], for importing copies of phonorecords in violation of section 602 
[17 U.S.C.S. § 602], or for any other violation under this title. 
(b) Remedies.  In a suit described in subsection (a) for a violation described in that 
subsection, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for 
the violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in 
a suit against any public or private entity other than a State, instrumentality of a 
State, or officer or employee of a State acting in his or her official capacity.  Such rem-
edies include impounding and disposition of infringing articles under section 503 [17 
U.S.C.S. § 503], actual damages and profits and statutory damages under section 504 
[17 U.S.C.S. § 504], costs and attorney’s fees under section 505 [17 U.S.C.S. § 505], and 
the remedies provided in section 510 [17 U.S.C.S. § 510]. 
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that have addressed the question.91  The Eleventh Circuit specifi-
cally held it unconstitutional in National Association of Boards of 
Pharmacy v. Board of Regents.92  While the Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed the constitutionality of the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act, it has found attempts to abrogate sovereign im-
munity in both trademark and patent litigation unconstitutional.93 
Of course, sovereign immunity is entirely irrelevant to private 
higher education institutions.  Such institutions would clearly be 
exposed to damages liability.  Given the Copyright Act’s generous 
statutory damages provisions, this exposure is, in a word, daunting.  
Even absent allegations or a finding of willfulness,94 defendants are 
open to between $750 and $30,000 in statutory damages per in-
fringed work.95  In other words, if the defendant in the Georgia 
State cases were a private institution, after winning on the fair use 
question as to all but five of the seventy-four allegedly infringed 
works, the institution would have been liable for between $3,750 
and $150,000 in statutory damages.  While the statute states that 
a court “shall remit statutory damages in any case where an in-
fringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that . . . 
use of the copyrighted work was a fair use . . . if the infringer was . 
. . an employee . . . of a nonprofit educational institution . . . acting 
within the scope of . . .  employment . . . ,”96 it is important to note 
that this by no means constitutes blanket immunity from damages 
liability.  First, actual damages remain available.97  Moreover, the 
exclusion of statutory damages only applies if the defendant “had 
reasonable grounds to believe” it was acting within the fair use pro-
vision.98  A thorough search returns no case law construing this 
statutory language.  Further, after the Georgia State decisions, it is 
difficult to conceive of the precise circumstances (other than strict 
adherence to the aforementioned Classroom Guidelines) that would 
 
For a recent scholarly treatment of sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment in the 
context of intellectual property litigation, see Michael Landau, State Sovereign Immunity 
and Intellectual Property Revisited, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 513 
(2012). 
 91. See Perez v. Piñeiro Caballero, No. 14–1276 (CVR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118282, 
at *10 (D.P.R. Aug. 25, 2014) (collecting cases). 
 92. Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 
1297, 1312–19 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 93. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) 
(Patent Remedy Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666 (1999) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act). 
 94. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2010). 
 95. Id. 
 96. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
 97. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
 98. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
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have to exist in order for an alleged infringer to reasonably believe 
the requirements of the fair use provision are met. 
Given the potential risks associated with asserting a fair use de-
fense in the context of a copyright infringement suit, we would ar-
gue that rather than assuming this defensive posture, educators 
would be best served by articulating the important role of education 
within copyright as a policy platform.  In light of some recent indi-
cations that there is some political will to endeavor towards a full-
scale revision of the Copyright Act,99 now might be the time for ed-
ucators to begin to articulate their vision for a Copyright Act that 
recognizes the particular role education plays in the copyright par-
adigm. 
IV. ASPIRING TO A COPYRIGHT ACT THAT RECOGNIZES THE 
CENTRALITY OF EDUCATION: ARTICULATING “EDUCATIONAL 
EXCEPTIONALISM” IN THE PRE-HISTORY OF THE NEXT GREAT 
COPYRIGHT ACT 
Rather than formulating litigation strategies, it might be more 
productive to aim legal strategizing towards a different audience—
Congress.  In order to do that with any hope of being effective, edu-
cators and educational institutions will have to both articulate a 
shared platform and locate the resources with which to advocate for 
that platform.  It is important to recognize, of course, that some of 
this advocacy is already underway,100 and that content owners have 
long dominated the conversation around copyright policy and have 
the money and the entrenched relationships necessary to continue 
to do so.101  Although we recognize the immense disadvantage edu-
 
 99. See, e.g., Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
315 (2013); see also infra notes 112 to 119 and accompanying text. 
 100. See, e.g., Affordable Higher Education, STUDENT PIRGS http://www.stu-
dentpirgs.org/campaigns/sp/affordable-higher-education (last visited Nov. 18, 2015). 
 101. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 216–18 (2004) (noting, as an 
example of lobbying efforts of copyright owners, the amount of money spent in the lobbying 
effort in support of the Copyright Term Extension Act).  As an interesting aside, Lawrence 
Lessig ran for the Democratic nomination for the Presidency on a single-issue platform, get-
ting money out of politics.  See Larry Lessig Announces He is Running for President, ABCNEWS 
(Sept. 6, 2015), available at http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/larry-lessig-announces-
running-president-33569612.  In an article published late in 2014, it was noted that Lessig’s 
interest in money in politics began with the Copyright Term Extension Act: 
Lessig’s crusade against money in politics can be traced back to 1998, when Congress 
passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, a law that retroactively added 
twenty years to the copyrights of movies and songs and other work.  Lessig visited 
Capitol Hill to argue that a retroactive extension served no purpose other than to lock 
down profits for copyright-holders; it could not inspire William Faulkner or George 
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cators have in this space, ceding legislative reform to content own-
ers leaves educators in the same quagmire they have been in since 
at least the passage of the 1976 Act—laboring under a fair use pro-
vision that fails to recognize that education is, in fact, materially 
different from filmmaking or music or publishing.  This is true not 
only because education is a largely non-profit enterprise in the 
United States, but also because without education the IP Clause’s 
purpose simply cannot be realized.  Advances in science, technology, 
and the humanities all require an educated populace and research 
facilities.  In America, it is educational institutions that fill these 
needs.    
In articulating the centrality of education to copyright, we would 
define educational exceptionalism a bit differently than Professor 
Jaszi does.  While Jaszi’s definition makes a descriptive claim about 
the way that educational uses have been treated in “copyright pol-
icy and fair use law,”102 this article makes a claim about the way 
educational uses ought to be treated in copyright policy and leaves 
fair use out of it altogether.  As such, this article defines educational 
exceptionalism as a recognition within the copyright statute that 
educational uses are central to the purpose of copyright, as articu-
lated in the IP Clause of the Constitution, “promot[ing] the Progress 
of Science and the useful Arts . . . .”103  Although the statute already 
contains some provisions that seem to reflect such an understand-
ing,104 the very structure of the statute in which the rights of copy-
right owners are broadly stated and exceptions are narrowly tai-
lored demonstrates the extent to which Congressional attention has 
 
Gershwin to create more work, because they were dead. To his surprise, many law-
makers were not entirely opposed to his view. ‘They hadn’t heard it, because it hadn’t 
had the same access,’ he said. Disney, he noted, had donated to the campaigns of eight-
een of the original twenty-five House members who sponsored the Bono act. It was the 
eleventh time in less than forty years that Congress had extended the term of existing 
copyrights. 
Evan Osnos, Embrace the Irony, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/embrace-irony. 
 102. Jaszi, supra note 19, at 36. 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2015) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as 
. . . teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use) . . . is not an infringement of copy-
right.”); 17 U.S.C. § 110 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following . . . 
[is] not [an] infringement(s) of copyright: (1) performance or display of a work by instructors 
or pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational institution. 
. . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (“The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an 
infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copy-
righted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent 
of a nonprofit educational institution . . . .”). 
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been “captured” by content owners.105  Educators can and must 
marshal the tools they have at their disposal to articulate an alter-
native vision.  One way we may begin to do that is to recognize the 
way in which educational users are, in fact, distinct from other us-
ers of copyrighted content. 
A. Education is a Public Good 
There is a school of thought that asserts education is a public 
good,  even if not in the strict economic sense,106 in that there are 
positive externalities associated with the acquisition of higher edu-
cation.107  To the extent that we recognize education as a public 
good, presumptive exemption of educational uses from the monop-
oly that is copyright makes sense.  In some sense, the Statute of 
Anne,108 the predecessor to the first Copyright Act in the United 
States,109 recognized this.  It was subtitled, “An Act for the Encour-
agement of Learning.”110  While the American copyright regime is 
not nearly as frank about the connection between copyright and ed-
ucation, the Supreme Court recently recognized just such a connec-
tion.  In Golan v. Holder,111 the Court stated: “[t]he provision of in-
centives for the creation of new works is surely an essential means 
to advance the spread of knowledge and learning.  We hold, how-
ever, that it is not the sole means Congress may use ‘[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science.’”112  While both the district court and the 
Eleventh Circuit took note of this language in determining that the 
first fair use factor favored a finding of fair use,113 here, the sugges-
tion is that this argument would be best raised proactively before 
Congress rather than reactively before courts.  There are some 
small, hopeful glimmers that, with the right message and messen-
gers, the concerns of educators may meet relatively fertile ground 
as Congress considers drafting the “Next Great Copyright Act.”114 
 
 105. Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 436 
(2007) (citing Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in 
the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 757 (2001)). 
 106. DOMINIC J. BREWER & PATRICK J. MCEWAN, ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 68–77 (2009). 
 107. Id. 
 108. The Statute of Anne, 8 Anne cl. 19 (1710), available at http://www.copyrighthis-
tory.com/anne.html. 
 109. Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possi-
bilities: The Life of a Legal Transplant, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1427 (2010). 
 110. 8 Anne cl. 19. 
 111. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 112. Id. at 889. 
 113. Georgia State, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1240; Georgia State II, 769 F.3d at 1282. 
 114. Pallante, supra note 99, at 315. 
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B. Some Glimmers of Hope in the Political Sphere 
There appears to be some political will to begin what will un-
doubtedly be a long and arduous process toward revising the Copy-
right Act.115  In 2013, Maria Pallante, the current Register of Cop-
yrights and the Director of the United States Copyright Office, de-
livered the Twenty-Sixth Horace S. Manges Lecture, an extended 
version of which was later published, entitled The Next Great Cop-
yright Act.116  In it, Pallante suggests that given the technological 
advances that have occurred since the 1976 Act was passed, it may 
be time to consider a wholesale revision of the Act.117  Pallante’s 
piece specifically notes the potential of the Next Great Copyright 
Act to more fully address the needs of educators.118  In addressing 
the need for Congressional attention directed towards the overlap 
of copyright and education, Pallante said: 
Congressional review of higher education—which is so dy-
namic—would be beneficial, especially because the legal frame-
work must ultimately support and encourage a variety of cop-
yright objectives.  These include: markets that produce quality 
educational materials, affordable licensing schemes, open 
source materials, the reasonable application of fair use, library 
exceptions, academic freedom—including the freedom of fac-
ulty to disclaim copyright in their own works—and formats 
that are accessible to persons with print disabilities.119 
Likewise, in late 2012, the Republican Study Committee issued a 
policy memo in which it signaled a need to reconsider copyright.120  
The memo, entitled Three Myths About Copyright and Where to 
Start to Fix It, does not specifically mention education but does list 
the fact that scientific inquiry is being hampered as evidence that 
 
 115. If the past is any prologue, the legislative history of the 1976 Act suggests that revis-
ing the copyright statute is likely to take awhile.  See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise 
and Legislative History: 
The official legislative history is long, comprising more than 30 studies, three reports 
issued by the Register of Copyrights, four panel discussions issued as committee prints, 
six series of subcommittee hearings, 18 committee reports, and the introduction of at 
least 19 general revision bills over a period of more than 20 years. 
72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 865 (1987): 
 116. Pallante, supra note 99, at 315. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 333 (“Higher education activities could also benefit from congressional direc-
tion.”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Matthew Yglesias, The Case of the Vanishing Policy Memo, SLATE MAGAZINE (Nov. 
19, 2012, 2:23 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2012/11/rsc_copy-
right_reform_memo_derek_khanna_tries_to_get_republican_study_committee.html. 
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there is too much copyright protection.121  This, of course, directly 
implicates the interests of educators and students.  The memo 
serves both as evidence for existing political will to address the 
problems presented by our current copyright regime and as the be-
ginnings of a platform that might be able to garner bipartisan sup-
port.  In order for educators to be best positioned to represent their 
interests and the interests of their institutions and students in the 
lead up to a wholesale copyright revision, we must first articulate 
for ourselves the types of policy changes we envision. 
C. Some Considerations in Formulating a Platform 
In this article, we hope to begin the conversation around potential 
organizing and advocating for recognition of the unique role of edu-
cation in achieving the goals embodied in the IP Clause.  In the long 
term, we envision the drafting of a policy platform that fully artic-
ulates the positions educators and educational institutions desire 
to see reflected in the next copyright act.  While setting out a com-
prehensive platform is beyond the scope of this piece and will re-
quire the input of a great many more people than the authors of this 
article, as well as data that, as far as we can tell, is not yet availa-
ble,122 our intent here is to begin to consider the basic concepts 
which we believe to be essential in shaping such a platform.  We 
offer three fundamental suggestions. 
First, it is essential to articulate a definition of education that is, 
at once, inclusive and precise.  While education is mentioned in a 
number of different places in the current Copyright Act,123 the stat-
ute contains no definition of the term.  Any platform intended to 
center education in the next copyright act will have to include such 
a definition.  We would suggest a definition that includes both K–
12 institutions and Colleges and Universities.  A modified version 
 
 121. The Republican Study Committee, RSC Policy Brief: Three Myths About Copyright 
and Where to Start to Fix it (Nov. 16, 2012), available at https://www.publicknowledge.org
/files/withdrawn_RSC_Copyright_reform_brief.pdf. 
 122. The conclusion of this article suggests a number of additional research projects that 
the authors believe will be necessary in laying the foundation for a comprehensive platform. 
 123. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as . . . 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use) . . . is not an infringement of copy-
right.”); 17 U.S.C. § 110 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following . . . 
[is] not [an] infringement(s) of copyright: (1) performance or display of a work by instructors 
or pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational institution. 
. . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (“The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an 
infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copy-
righted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent 
of a nonprofit educational institution . . . .”). 
194 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 54 
of the definition of “educational organization” provided by the In-
ternal Revenue Service might be a starting point.124  We would sug-
gest the following preliminary definition: “A not-for-profit entity 
whose mission is the instruction or training of individuals for the 
purpose of improving or developing their capabilities.” 
The other two essential elements in the platform we are envision-
ing are related and reflect a recognition of two important facts.  
First, we are at the very beginning of the process of revising the 
Copyright Act.  Second, some of the problems associated with the 
treatment of educational uses under the 1976 Act stem from a fail-
ure to envision the myriad ways the world would change in the af-
termath of the adoption of the Act.  In light of these realities, it is 
essential that any platform educators propound the capacity for 
flexibility as to developments in technology and an awareness that 
educators and students engage a multitude of copyrighted materi-
als in the twenty-first century.  There is no question that the draft-
ers of the 1976 Act could not have envisioned a world in which 
online instruction is a growing reality at every level.125  Likewise, 
the legislative history of the Technology, Education and Copyright 
Harmonization Act of 2001 demonstrates a recognition that there 
was no sense in 1976 of the extent to which non-traditional works 
would be important materials for academic engagement in the 
twenty-first century.126  Any platform that hopes to be relevant at 
the time of the adoption of a new copyright act, and for any period 
of time thereafter, must have the capacity to withstand the test of 
a future we can scarcely envision. 
These fundamental considerations are merely the beginning of 
the process of thinking through the particulars of a policy platform 
built to advance the interests of teachers and students.  What fol-
lows are some thoughts on the research projects that could come 
next. 
 
 124. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(3) (2014). 
 125. See, e.g., Associated Press, Online Education Rises in Popularity, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 
1, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/1/online-education-rises-in-popu-
larity/ (discussing the increase in student enrollment in online education at the K–12 level); 
Editorial, Online Education Has Made College a Different World, VERDE INDEPENDENT, (Aug. 
20, 2015, 12:51 PM), http://verdenews.com/main.asp?SectionID=36&subsectionID=1191&ar-
ticleID=66900. 
 126. See generally S. REP. NO. 107–31 (2001), available at https://www.congress.gov/con-
gressional-report/107th-congress/senate-report/31/1?q=S.+487+%28107%29. 
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V. CONCLUSION: A CODA 
Our aim in this article was to suggest that educators consider an 
alternative to relying upon the existing educational fair use para-
digm, which has thus far not served the interests of educational in-
stitutions, educators, or, ultimately, students.  Rather than resign-
ing ourselves to being on the defensive in seeking to demonstrate 
the importance of education to the underlying purpose of copyright, 
we have suggested adopting a more proactive posture and aiming 
our narrative at Congress, as it appears to be gearing up to look 
anew at the Copyright Act.  The first step in advancing towards the 
proposal for legislative reform that we have outlined here is to begin 
the work of collecting some necessary data.  This includes data on 
existing policies and behaviors within educational institutions.  The 
specific research questions, as we see them, include: (1) to what ex-
tent do educators utilize copyrighted works without first obtaining 
licenses; and (2) are the existing copyright policies of educational 
institutions sufficient to insulate them from copyright infringement 
liability.  This work will require empirical expertise and, more spe-
cifically, expertise in studying behavior that is likely to be perceived 
as wrong.  Another important avenue of research will be identifying 
existing organizations positioned to advocate on behalf of educators 
in the copyright policy arena. 
This article was intended not as the final word on what educators 
should do with regard to copyright policy but, rather, as a starting 
place for a move towards organizing and advocating for ourselves, 
our institutions, and, ultimately, our students.  There remains, of 
course, a tremendous amount of work to be done. 
